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1 Introduction
There are often cases in economics in which one is interested in the effect of
an endogenous dichotomous treatment on an outcome which takes on non-
negative integer values with cardinal interpretation (count data). Examples
include, but are not limited to, the effect of physician advice on individual
alcohol or cigarettes consumption (Kenkel and Terza 2001), the effect of
health status on the number of visits to a general pratictioner (Windmaijer
and Santos Silva 1997), the effect of health insurance coverage on the number
of doctor or hospital visits (Riphahn et al. 2003) or the effect of female
employment on fertility (Kalwij 2000).1
In all these applications the treatment of interest is likely to be endoge-
nous.2 Receiving physician advice of reducing smoking or drinking is cer-
tainly not exogenous with respect to the intensity of those activities. Health
conditions may not be exogenous with respect to the number of visits to a
doctor since individuals who are less concerned with their health may en-
gage in health damaging behavior and at the same time be less prone to see
a doctor. Similarly, demand for health insurance is clearly endogenous as
high-risk types are expected to buy more comprehensive coverage. Last but
not least, female employment status is likely to be endogenous with respect
to fertility, since women with a lower taste for children may decide both to
participate into the labor market and have fewer children.
In addition to an endogeneity problem, in all these cases one is likely to
have also an endogenous participation problem.3 Indeed, participation to an
activity, such as smoking, drinking or seeing a doctor (the extensive margin)
and the intensity of the activity (the number of cigarettes or drinks consumed
or the number of visits) may be two very different processes. For this rea-
son, one might want let the two processes to be produced by different data
generating processes (DGPs, hereafter). For instance, one is likely to see a
doctor only if she is ill, and the amount of health insurance coverage may
have an effect only on the intensive margin of the activity, not on the fact
that one sees or does not see a doctor. There are other cases in which the
treatment might have different effects on the intensive and the extensive mar-
gins. For instance, women who have a low taste for children may both work
1See Winkelmann (1998) and Greene (2009) for a review of count data models with
selectivity.
2This issue is acknowledged and addressed in all the articles we cited.
3Here, we use a terminology different from Greene (2009) who considers self-selection
into the treatment as an instance of ‘endogenous participation’. In what follows, by ‘par-
ticipation’ we generally mean participation in the activity measured by the main (count)
outcome variable (e.g., drinking, smoking).
5and remain childless; and the negative correlation between employment and
children could be caused by spurious association induced by the exclusion of
an important control variable — taste for children — which is unobservable.
However, conditional on overcoming the threshold of becoming mother, it is
perfectly intuitive that working women may have more children than women
who do not participate in the labor market due to an income effect; this
positive association reflecting a causal effect.
In other cases, one may have a sample selection issue. In a sample of
smokers or drinkers, for instance, data on cigarette or alcohol consumption
may have not been reported by all individuals, and may not be missing at
random with respect to the level of drinking or smoking. In this case, ne-
glecting sample selection will lead to inconsistent estimates of the treatment
of interest (e.g., physician advice).
Although the applications above mentioned are very frequent, to the best
of our knowledge, to date only Terza et al. (2008) and Li and Trivedi (2009)
have suggested strategies to address endogenous treatment and endogenous
participation at the same time. Terza et al. (2008) put forward a two-step
estimator for an interval grouped dependent variable which relies on a joint
normality assumption. In this paper, in contrast, we propose an estimation
method which is appropriate to deal with endogenous treatment affects and
with either sample selection or endogenous participation when the depen-
dent variable is a count. Li and Trivedi (2009), on their side, use a Bayesian
approach to estimate a model for a continuous and non negative dependent
variable with endogenous participation and multivariate treatments. Multi-
nomial normality is required. Our estimator is similar in spirit to the ones
proposed by Terza et al. (2008) and Li and Trivedi (2009), and relies on
the same distributional assumptions. The approach, however, is different as
we use maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). As a consequence, we gain in
efficiency with respect to the two-step estimator of Terza et al. and obtain
correct standard errors in the usual way unlike the two-step approach where
standard errors need to be corrected after estimation. With respect to Li
and Trivedi (2009) the estimator presented here is different in the sense that
we use a frequentist rather than a Bayesian approach.
We illustrate the performance of our proposed estimator using data from
Kenkel and Terza (2001), who study the effect of physician advice on drink-
ing.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we report
a description of the econometric model, distinguishing between models with
endogenous treatment and sample selection vs. models with endogenous
treatment and endogenous participation. In section 3 we apply our estimator
to Kenkel and Terza (2001) study on physician advice and drinking. Section
64 summarizes our main findings.
2 The econometric model
We aim to develop a model for a count variable yi that is function of a
dummy variable Ti representing the i-th individual treatment status, with
Ti = 1 if the individual has been treated and Ti = 0 if she has not been
treated. The treatment dummy is always observed and, from a theoretical
point of view, is a genuine (causal) shifter of the conditional distribution of
yi. We say that Ti is an endogenous treatment if treatment status is not
random, but there are unobservable individual characteristics affecting Ti
that also affect the outcome yi. We define a second dummy that represents
either a sample selection rule or a participation rule. The second dummy is
denoted as Si when it represents a selection rule and as Pi when it represents
a participation rule. Although we will refer to models using individual-level
data, the individual i subscripts are omitted throughout to simplify notation.
2.1 Background
In the case of sample selection y is missing for a non negligible proportion of
the sample and the selection rule is defined in such a way that S = 1 when
y is observed and S = 0 when y is missing. S is always observed and, in
contrast to the treatment dummy, the sample selection rule S has no genuine
effect on the conditional distribution of y. We say that S is an endogenous
(sample) selection rule if unobservable heterogeneity that affects S is also a
determinant of y. Finally, if the second dummy represents a participation
rule both y and P are, always, observed. In this case, however, P = 0 when
y = 0 and P = 1 when y > 0. Again, from a theoretical point of view,
the participation dummy P is not expected to be a genuine shifter of the
conditional distribution of y and we say that P is an endogenous partici-
pation rule if unobserved heterogeneity affecting P also affects y. In what
follows, we will refer to T as sorting individuals between the treated and
non-treated groups and S and P as partitioning the sample between individ-
uals for whom the outcome is observed/unobserved or between individuals
who participate/don’t participate in the main activity.
The terminology we have just introduced deserves a point of clarification.
First, one should note that all three cases – endogenous treatment, endoge-
nous selection, and endogenous participation – have in common the fact that
there is a dummy variable that sorts/partitions the individuals into two mu-
tually excluding groups : treated vs. non-treated, observed vs. unobserved,
7active participants vs. non active participants. Second, in all three cases,
‘endogeneity’ denotes the fact that unobservable heterogeneity affecting the
partitioning/sorting dummy is also a determinant of the main response y.
Now, if the similarities are important, the differences are equally relevant.
In endogenous sample selection there is a problem of non ignorable missing
data (y is missing when S = 0) and the partitioning dummy has no effect
on the conditional distribution of y (see, for instance, Heckman 1979, Little
and Rubin 2002). In contrast, endogenous treatment has nothing to do with
missing data but is rather a problem of an endogenous explanatory dummy
variable that is a genuine shifter of the conditional distribution of y (see,
for instance, Heckman 1978; 1992). Finally, in endogenous participation the
partitioning dummy has nothing to do with missing data and it is neither
an endogenous dummy explanatory variable. It is, in other words, a midway
case in which the same unobservables may affect both the intensive and the
extensive margins of an activity, which are, however, two separate choices.
A number of previous papers have suggested strategies for estimating
count data models with either sample selection or endogenous treatment,
though not both at the same time. Greene (1997), Terza (1998), Winkelmann
(1998), Miranda (2004) and Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006) discuss fully
parametric methods for estimating count data models based on the Poisson
distribution and normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity. Kenkel and
Terza (2001) use a flexible Box-Cox specification for the count and normally
distributed unobserved heterogeneity to develop a two-step method for es-
timating the endogenous treatment model. Windmaijer and Santos Silva
(1997) discuss a GMM strategy that only requires the specification of the
conditional mean of the count y and it is thus less restrictive in terms of the
distributional assumptions about y that the researcher needs to impose to
achieve a consistent estimator.
The endogenous participation model is closely related to the double-
hurdle model of Cragg (1971), the Tobit-type estimator for censored Pois-
son regression of Terza (1985), the hurdle model of Mullahy (1986), the
double-hurdle model of Jones (1989), the two-part model of Mullahy (1998),
the endogenous hurdle of Greene (2009), and the zero-inflated count model
of Melkersson and Rooth (2000). All these models are motivated by the
idea that individuals most cross one or two hurdles before a strict positive
value of the dependent variable y is observed. Further, the zero outcome is
thought to be special in the sense that a large proportion of the individuals
in the sample choose y = 0 and that the participation decision is qualita-
tively different from the intensity of consumption decision. For these reasons
the models above suggest specifying a different data generating mechanism
for zero and strictly positive y. These models have been used to analyze
8smoking, drinking, and fertility behavior among other applications. Endoge-
nous participation is allowed in Greene (2009) and Mullahy (1998). None of
the aforementioned models allow endogenous participation and endogenous
treatment at the same time.
Deb and Trivedi (2006) have proposed a multinomial endogenous treat-
ment model that accommodates correlated endogenous sorting into different
treatments — though neither endogenous sample selection nor endogenous
participation. In particular, they consider J mutually exclusive endogenous
treatments that affect the count dependent variable y, which is always ob-
served. Correlated endogenous sorting is present in this model because at
any time only one of the J treatments is active and so the treatments play
also the role of a set of, correlated, partitioning dummies that split the sam-
ple into different sub-samples. The main drawback of this approach is that
the treatment dummies are, by definition, equal to the sample partition-
ing dummies. Hence, for instance, one cannot be assigned to the sample of
treated individuals and to the sub-sample of individuals non-participating
in the main activity at the same time. The models discussed in this paper
are different from Deb and Trivedi multinomial endogenous treatment model
in two important aspects. First, the role of the sample partitioning dummy
deals explicitly with a pressing feature of the data: either sample selection
or endogenous participation. Second, the treatment dummy is different from
the selection (participation) dummy. Hence, an individual can be assigned
to treatment T = 1 (e.g., having received physician advice) and sub-sample
P = 0 (e.g., not smoking).
Terza et al. (2008) and Li and Trivedi (2009) contribute the only pieces
of previous work that, to the best of our knowledge, are capable of dealing
with endogenous treatment and endogenous participation at the same time.
Terza et al. (2008) propose a two-step method for analyzing the effect of pre-
natal care-giver advice on alcohol consumption by pregnant women, where
zero vs. strictly positive consumption plays the role of the participation rule
and the care-giver advice the role of the endogenous treatment. Alcohol con-
sumption is an interval coded count. This is an extension of Mullahy (1998)
Modified Two Part Model. Despite being a two-step approach, Terza et al.’s
method is not a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estima-
tor but relies on joint multivariate normality. Unlike Terza et al. (2008), we
describe in subsection 2.3 a model for a count rather than for an interval
coded count. Also, because we use Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) techniques, our methods deliver an estimator that is more efficient
than the two-step method suggested by Terza et al. (2008) and, unlike two-
step methods, directly provides correct standard errors.
Li and Trivedi (2009) estimate a model with multinomial endogenous
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variable. They apply their methods to estimate the impact of prescription
drug coverage on drug expenditure of the elderly. The authors implement
both a GMM and a Bayesian estimator. The GMM estimator allows for en-
dogenous multivariate treatments but does not control for endogenous par-
ticipation. The Bayesian estimator, in contrast, deals with both problems at
the same time. Their findings show that the GMM estimator appears to over-
estimate the impact of drug coverage due to positive selection. With respect
to Li and Trivedi (2009)’s Bayesian estimator, our approach to modeling both
endogenous treatment effects and endogenous participation (or sample selec-
tion) is based on a different (but equally fully parametric) approach (FIML)
and analyzes a count outcome, rather than a continuous dependent variable.
2.2 Endogenous selection: y missing when S = 0
The model with endogenous sample selection considers the case where the
dependent count variable y for a given individual is missing if the selection
dummy S takes on value zero and is observed if the selection dummy takes
on value one. The endogenous treatment is denoted as T . The endogenous
treatment and the selection dummies are generated according to a continuous
latent variable model:
T ∗ = z′γ + v, (1)
S∗ = r′θ + ϕT + q (2)
with T = 1(T ∗ > 0), S = 1(S∗ > 0), and vectors z and r represent a set of
explanatory variables (including the constant term) with dimension KT × 1
and KS × 1, respectively. γ and θ are conformable vectors of coefficients, ϕ
is the coefficient of the treatment dummy in the selection equation, and v
and q are residual terms. We assume that the count y is generated according
to the following conditional cumulative distribution function,
F (y|η) ≡ P (y|η) =
{
not defined if S = 0
[µy exp (−µ)] /y! if S = 1. (3)
with,
y =
{
missing if S = 0
0, 1, 2, . . . if S = 1,
and where P(.) denotes ‘probability of,’ η is a random variable representing
unobserved individual heterogeneity, and µ ≡ E [y|x, T, η]. We use a log-
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linear model for specifying the conditional mean of y given S, T , and η:
ln (µ) = x′β + δT + η, (4)
where, again, vector x represents a Ky× 1 vector of explanatory variables, β
is a vector of conformable coefficients, and δ is the coefficient of the treatment
dummy in the equation of the main response count y. Finally, correlation
between T , S, and y is induced by imposing some structure on the residuals
of equations (1) and (2),
v = λ1η + ζ
q = λ2η + ξ,
(5)
where ζ and ξ are ‘idiosyncratic’ error terms and λ = {λ1, λ2} ∈ R2 are free
factor loadings to be estimated along the other parameters.
To close the model we require the covariates to be all exogenous and
impose some distributional conditions
D(η|x, z, r, ζ, ξ) = D(η) (C1)
D(ζ|x, z, r, η) = D(ζ|η) (C2)
D(ξ|x, z, r, η) = D(ξ|η) (C3)
ζ ⊥ ξ | η, (C4)
where D(.) stands for ‘distribution of.’ Condition C1 is the usual random
effects assumption, which requires the unobserved individual heterogeneity
term η to be independent of all explanatory variables in the system as well
as independent of errors ζ and ξ. The conditional independence assumptions
in C2 and C3 are weaker than calling for ζ and/or ξ to be independent of
the explanatory variables and thus accommodate some limited dependence
between control variables and idiosyncratic errors. C1-C3 together ensure
exogeneity of all explanatory variables x, z, and r. Finally, condition C4
requires the idiosyncratic errors to be independent of each other conditional
on η. Again, this does not rule out some dependence between ζ and ξ. In
what follows we assume that η ∼ N(0, σ2η) and that ζ|η and ξ|η are both
distributed as independent standard normal variates.
The model is identified by restrictions on the covariance matrix and by
functional form. So, x, z, and r can all have the same elements. How-
ever, specifying some exclusion restrictions for the selection and/or treat-
ment equations is always advisable when it is possible. Note that in this
parametrization Var(vi) = (λ
2
1σ
2
η + 1) and Var(qi) = (λ
2
2σ
2
η + 1) instead of
the usual probit normalization of Var(vi) = Var(qi) = 1. As a consequence,
coefficients in (1) and (2) will be larger than the usual probit coefficients.
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After estimation, one can recover the usual probit parametrization multiply-
ing coefficients in (1) and (2) by a factor of 1/
√
λ21σ
2
η + 1 and 1/
√
λ22σ
2
η + 1,
respectively.
If claiming independence between all explanatory variables and the un-
observed heterogeneity term η is judged untenable for a particular applica-
tion, instead of requiring condition C1 one could follow Mundlak (1978)
and Chamberlain (1980) correlated random effects approach and assume
η|w ∼ N(w′ψ, σ2a), for a vector w that can contain some elements of
x, z, and r and where ψ is a vector of conformable coefficients. This as-
sumption imposes some restrictions to the way explanatory variables and
the unobserved heterogeneity term η can be related but allows at least some
dependence.
The use of the Poisson distribution for the analysis of count data has been
criticized in the past due to the unattractive feature that mean and variance
are restricted to be equal, also known as equidispersion (see, for instance,
Winkelmann 2008). In the present model, however, the introduction of the
unobserved heterogeneity term η in the log-linear model for µ ≡ E[y|x, T, η]
forces the count variable y to exhibit overdispersion. In fact, it can be shown
that:
κ ≡ E [y|x, T ] = Eη [E[y|x, T, η]] = exp(x′β + δT +
σ2η
2
) (6)
Var [y|x, T ] = κ{1 + κ[exp(σ2η)− 1]} , (7)
so that, in general, Var[y|x, T ] ≥ E[y|x, T ] because ση ≥ 0 by definition.
This implies, therefore, that the methods here described cannot be used to fit
underdispersed count data because in that case Var[y|x, T ] < E[y|x, T ] and η
cannot have negative variance. To the knowledge of the authors no method
has been suggested in the literature that could deal with underdispersed
count data and either sample selection or an endogenous treatment effect,
let alone the two problems together.
Correlations between y, T , and S are functions of the factor loadings λ1
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and λ2. In particular, the model implies the following correlations:
ρy,T =
λ1σ
2
η√
σ2η(λ
2
1σ
2
η + 1)
(8)
ρy,S =
λ2σ
2
η√
σ2η(λ
2
2σ
2
η + 1)
(9)
ρT,S =
λ1λ2σ
2
η√
(λ21σ
2
η + 1)(λ
2
2σ
2
η + 1)
. (10)
The treatment dummy T is an exogenous variable in the main response
equation whenever ρy,T = 0. Similarly, If ρy,S = 0 sample selection is ex-
ogenous in the main response equation. Notice that even if ρy,S ≈ 0, such
that ρ̂y,S = 0, one cannot ignore the selection problem altogether if ρT,S 6= 0
and ρy,T 6= 0 because in that case S will be still dependent on y through the
relationship between y and T and the fact that T is a control variable in the
selection equation. As a consequence, y cannot be claimed to be missing at
random (MAR) and ignoring the selection mechanism will lead the researcher
to obtain inconsistent estimators of β and δ (for more on this topic see, for
instance, Little and Rubin 2002). If ρy,S = ρy,T = 0, on the other hand, one
can obtain consistent estimators of β and δ on the basis of a simple Poisson
regression fitted on the sub-sample for which y is not missing, even if ρT,S 6= 0
(see Wooldridge 2002, p. 557).4
In a similar fashion, if ρy,T = 0 and δ 6= 0 the endogenous treatment
problem can only be neglected if either ρT,S = 0 or ρy,S = 0. Clearly, if both
ρy,T 6= 0 and ρy,S 6= 0 then neither endogenous selection nor endogenous
treatment can be ignored.
Let PS(0|η) denote the conditional probability of S = 0 given η and
PS(1|η) the conditional probability of S = 1 given η. Here, to simplify
notation, we do not explicitly write the conditioning on observable variables.
In a similar fashion, PT (τ |η) represents the probability of T = τ given η,
with τ = {0, 1}. Finally, denote by F (y|η) the cumulative distribution of y
given η which is defined by equations (3) and (4) together. The log-likelihood
4Selection is ignorable if D(y|x, z, r, S) = D(y|x, z, r). Joint normality and condition
ρy,S = ρy,T = 0 ensures this regardless of the value that ρT,S may take.
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function is then:
log(L) =
∑
i,Si=0
∑
τ
ωτ ln
{∫
PS(0|η)PT (τ |η)φ(η)dη
}
+
∑
i,Si=1
∑
τ
ωτ ln
{∫
PS(1|η)PT (τ |η)F (y|η)φ(η)dη
} (11)
where φ(·) is the density of a normal variate with mean zero and variance
σ2η, ω0 = 1(T = 0), and ω1 = 1(T = 1).
The integrals in equation (11) do not have a closed form solution and
must be numerically evaluated. We use MSL (for a detailed discussion on
MSL, see, Train 2003). To evaluate the integrals we use Halton sequences
instead of uniform pseudorandom sequences. Halton draws have been shown
to achieve high precision with fewer draws than uniform pseudorandom se-
quences because they have a better coverage of the [0, 1] interval. A modified
Newton-Raphson algorithm is used for maximization, using analytical first
derivatives and numerical second derivatives. At convergence Eicker-Huber-
White robust standard errors are computed. Standard errors for marginal
effects are computed using the Delta method.
The use of a common latent factor structure like that written in (5) has
four main advantages over the alternative of specifying a multivariate nor-
mal distribution for v, q, and η (see also Deb and Trivedi 2006). First, the
common latent variable approach can be used quite flexibly to combine ap-
propriately chosen conditional and marginal distributions that generate the
joint distribution that the researcher wants to write. Second, it has a natu-
ral interpretation as proxies for unobserved covariates since they enter into
the equations in the same way as observed covariates. The factor loadings
can therefore be interpreted in much the same way as coefficients on ob-
served covariates can. Third, it provides a parsimonious representation of
error correlations in models with a large number of equations. Last but not
least, and quite importantly for computational feasibility, the latent variable
approach transforms a problem in which calculation of the log-likelihood in-
volves evaluating a three dimensional integral into a problem where only a
one dimensional integral needs to be evaluated.
2.3 Endogenous participation: y = 0 when P = 0
The model with endogenous participation is very similar to the model that
deals with sample selection but here the participation dummy P has nothing
to do with missing data. Instead, endogenous participation explicitly ad-
dresses the problem that zero values and strictly positive values of the count
y reflect two qualitatively different decisions. While a zero count implies
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a potentially conscious decision of non participation into a given activity
(say, drinking or smoking), the strictly positive count implies that a poten-
tially conscious decision of participating was taken before the actual level
of consumption was set. As we discussed earlier, these two decisions are
potentially affected by different variables and could follow, therefore, two
different DGPs. As before, we assume that the treatment dummy T and the
participation dummy P are generated as follows:
T ∗ = z′γ + v, (12)
P ∗ = r′θ + ϕT + q (13)
with T = 1(T ∗ > 0), P = 1(P ∗ > 0). The count y is generated according to
the following cumulative conditional distribution function,
G (y|η) =
{
not defined if P = 0
[µy exp (−µ)] /[exp(µ)− 1]y! if P = 1. (14)
with,
y =
{
0 if P = 0
1, 2, . . . if P = 1
(15)
ln (µ) = x′β + δT + η, (16)
and all other remaining aspects of the model are the same as in subsection
2.2. The main difference from the model presented here and the one in the
previous subsection is the fact that here we use a zero-truncated Poisson
distribution for y given P = 1 whereas we used a Poisson for y given S = 1
in the endogenous selection model. This is a minor modification that reflects
the fact that in the endogenous participation model the y = 0 count is
generated by a different data generating mechanism from y > 0 counts.
Another important difference is the fact that now every single individual
in the sample will contribute, always, a non missing observation for y. The
likelihood function is now written as follows:
log(L) =
∑
i,Pi=0
∑
τ
ωτ ln
{∫
PP (0|η)PT (τ |η)φ(η)dη
}
+
∑
i,Pi=1
∑
τ
ωτ ln
{∫
PP (1|η)PT (τ |η)G(y|η)φ(η)dη
}
,
(17)
where G(y|η) is the cumulative distribution of y given η, ω0 = 1(T = 0), and
ω1 = 1(T = 1). Again, the model is estimated by MSL.
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3 An application to the effect of physician
advice on drinking
In this section we apply the count data model with endogenous treatment
effects and endogenous participation to the problem of estimating the treat-
ment effect of physician advice on alcohol consumption using data from
Kenkel and Terza (2001). However, before doing it, we introduce a very
simple behavioral model to motivate our work and interpret the empirical
results.
3.1 An underlying behavioral model
Let us assume that an individual’s latent (continuous) index of ‘bad’ health
status T ∗, i.e. higher T ∗ means worse health, depends on some observable
characteristics x, some specific past health problems z1 (diabetes, high pres-
sure, etc.), her intertemporal discount rate η,5 and an unpredictable lifetime
health endowment ζ, that is
T ∗ = z′γ + λ1η + ζ (18)
where z = (x, z1) and x includes an intercept.
6 Our theoretical expectation
is that λ1 > 0 because individuals with high discount rates are expected to
engage in health-damaging behavior such as smoking or drinking at higher
rates than individuals with low discount rates. Hence, people with high η
are expected to be in worse health.
We assume that a physician can observe T ∗, for instance using her knowl-
edge and specialized medical exams, and she gives her patient the advice
to reduce drinking if T ∗ goes above a given threshold a. We normalize the
threshold to zero (this is innocuous since z includes an intercept term). Thus,
the physician advice’s rule becomes T = 1(T ∗ > 0), where T is the observed
treatment dummy for physician advice.7 In particular,
5We will often refer to ηi as to the intertemporal discount rate (ri), although it should
be considered as a strictly increasing transform of the discount rate, ηi = f(ri), such that
f : R+ 7−→ R (e.g., the logarithm transform), where we assume that ri can be arbitrarily
close to zero but not exactly zero.
6The vector of variables z1 represents a set of exclusion restrictions, which provides an
additional source of identification over and above functional form and covariance matrix
restrictions.
7We use a rather simplified mechanism underlying the physician’s advice. In reality,
giving advice to reduce drinking may involve a physician’s choice and depend on her
characteristics. However, these characteristics are not observed in the data we will use in
the next section, and we prefer to use a simplified approach.
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P(T = 1) = P(T ∗ > 0)
= P(ζ ≤ λ1η + z′γ), (19)
which we label the treatment equation or physician advice equation (in the
writing of equation (19) we suppose that the distribution of ζ is symmetric).
Hence, it is clear that individuals with high discount rates are more likely
to have worse health, and to receive drinking advice (as λ1 > 0) because for
them receiving a relatively small health endowment ζ will trigger the health
threshold more often than for individuals with low discount rates.
The individual derives utility from drinking, and the demand for alcohol
consumption, given the intertemporal discount rate, η is
ln {E [y|x, T, η]} = x′β + δT + η, (20)
which represents the drinking intensity equation. Our theoretical prediction
is that δ < 0. That is, physician advice is expected to reduce drinking.
Denote the utility of being a current drinker as Uy>0, that of being a non-
drinker as Uy=0, and their difference as P
∗
i = Uy>0−Uy=0. We also define an
indicator P which equals one if the individual is a current drinker, that is if
drunk alcohol in the last two weeks, and zero otherwise. The difference in
the two utilities is parametrized as:
P ∗ = x′θ + ϕT + λ2η + ξ. (21)
Physician advice should reduce the probability of actively participating in the
drinking activity. Hence, we expect ϕ < 0. At the same time, we expect that
people with a high intertemporal discount rate will be less willing to refrain
from participating in an activity that gives them positive utility in exchange
for future better health and a longer life-span. So, we expect λ2 > 0.
8 Then,
P(P = 1) = P(P ∗ > 0)
= P(ξ ≤ x′θ + ϕT + λ2η). (22)
In other words, a high intertemporal discount rate η increases the likelihood
that an individual will drink alcohol, P = 1. We label (22) the participation
equation or drinking participation equation (writing (22) we suppose, again,
8With respect to the model in section 2.3, here we have assumed that the same covari-
ates enter the difference in utilities and the demand for alcohol consumption.
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that the distribution of ξ is symmetric).
This simple behavioral model could explain why we are likely to have a
non-zero correlation between the unobservables in the drinking intensity, the
endogenous treatment, and the endogenous participation equations. In par-
ticular, our theoretical predictions suggest that the unobservable intertempo-
ral discount rate η is likely to induce a positive correlation between the error
term in the physician advice equation and the error term in the drinking in-
tensity equation, causing the treatment dummy T be an endogenous variable
in (20). In other words, we expect ρy,T > 0. Similarly, the discount rate η
is likely to induce a positive correlation between the errors in the drinking
intensity and the drinking participation equation, creating an endogenous
participation problem. Hence, our prediction is ρy,P > 0. Last but not least,
in the model above, the intertemporal discount rate η also makes the physi-
cian advice dummy T endogenous in the drinking participation equation. As
a consequence, ρT,P > 0 is expected.
The model in this section also represents an example of economic prob-
lems where one unobservable individual characteristic (η, the discount factor
in our specific case) is likely to affect many processes, induce correlation be-
tween them, and raise endogeneity issues. In all these cases, using the latent
factor structure outlined in section 2 may be justified not only in terms of
convenience but also by economic theory.
As we will see, this very simple behavioral model is able to explain many
of the features of the Kenkel and Terza’s study that we aim to replicate in
the next section, and will be useful to interpret our empirical results.
3.2 The Kenkel and Terza (2001) study
Building on the behavioral model sketched in the previous section here we
specify the econometric model that in this specific case takes the form of a
Poisson model with endogenous treatment effects and endogenous participa-
tion.
For the purpose of illustration, we use the same data – the 1990 National
Health Interview Survey – and adopt the same empirical specification and
exclusion restrictions used by Kenkel and Terza (2001).9 Our aim is to show
how estimates of treatment effects are sensitive to various assumptions about
endogeneity of treatment status and participation. In the Kenkel and Terza’s
study drinking is measured as the number of drinks consumed in the last two
9Although the model is formally identified by functional form, Kenkel and Terza (2001)
provide an additional source of identification ‘through exclusion restrictions involving a
set of eleven variables related to health insurance status, physician contacts, and health
problems’ (p. 176). The plausibility of these restrictions is discussed by the authors.
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weeks.10 Physician advice about drinking is built from respondents’ answers
to the following question: ‘Have you ever been told by a physician to drink
less?’
The authors drop from the analysis lifetime abstainers and former drinkers
with no drinking in the past year. Because the physician advice to cut drink-
ing was recommended as a way of reducing high blood pressure, the authors
focus only on men who have drunk alcohol at least once in the last 12 months
and report having been told at some time that they had high blood pressure.11
In spite of this, Kenkel and Terza observe in their sample that 21% of current
drinkers (according to their definition) did not drink at all in the last two
weeks. Various reasons may be behind the excess of zeros. First, it could be
that y = 0 are contributed by recent quitters or people who were actively
trying to stop drinking all together in the last 12 months. Second, y = 0
could also be contributed by individuals who drink only in very special oc-
casions such as weddings, birthdays, or Christmas day (occasional drikers).
Finally, y = 0 could be contributed by ‘frequent’ drinkers who, by chance,
did not drink any alcohol in the past two weeks; although this last scenario
is less likely. Clearly, the fact that a good proportion of these zeros are
contributed by occasional drinkers suggests that the excess zeros cannot be
ignored. The authors acknowledge this and account for the excess of zeros by
using a flexible functional form for the conditional mean of drinking based on
the inverse Box-Cox transformation. An alternative way of addressing this
issue within the standard Poisson model, which we follow here, is to treat
the zeros and the positive drinking outcomes as if they were generated by
two separate DGPs (see Terza 1998). More details on the data and the
control variables used are available in the original study. Table 1 reports the
definitions and the means of all the variables, which match the corresponding
means in Kenkel and Terza (2001). The Table also provides information on
which variables are used to indentify the model (exclusion restrictions).
10Kenkel and Terza states ‘This is calculated as the product of self-reported drinking
frequency (the number of days in the past two weeks with any drinking) and drinking
intensity (the average number of drinks on a day with any drinking)’, (p. 171-172).
11A potential problem with this sample selection is that the decision to quit drinking may
be affected by health status, so that in the sample one is likely to observe only ‘healthy’
drinkers. Kenkel and Terza argue that this is likely to induce only a small selection bias as
in the the National Health Interview Survey only 12% of individuals declare not to drink
because of health problems.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 The effect of the treatment
In this section we focus only on the effect of the treatment of interest (physi-
cian advice). As we said, we use the same specifications (and exclusion
restrictions) of the original article for the treatment and the drinking inten-
sity equations.
The first column of Table 2 reports the marginal effects from a Poisson
model where the treatment – physician advice – is considered as exogenous.12
The results are similar to those reported by Kenkel and Terza in the models
where physician advice is considered exogenous (see Table III in their ar-
ticle): advice appears to have a counterintuitive positive effect on drinking
that is statistically significant at 1%. Column 2 reports the marginal effects
of physician advice on the probability of drinking obtained from a simple pro-
bit model, and also in this case, advice turns out to be positively correlated
with drinking. Column 3 reports the marginal effects when the potential
endogeneity of advice is taken into account but endogenous participation is
neglected using an Endogenous Treatment (ET) Poisson model. This model
assumes that both zeros and positive y outcomes are produced by the same
DGP. This model (and the following models estimated using MSL) was es-
timated using 400 Halton draws.13 First, note that the correlation between
the errors in the drinking intensity and the physician advice equation ρy,T
is positive, as expected, and statistically significant at 1%. Hence, advice T
is endogenous with respect to drinking y. In other words, individuals who
have a higher latent propensity to drink are also more likely to receive ad-
vice. Second, the marginal effect of physician advice turns out to be negative,
statistically significant, and amounts to a bit less than −51
2
(5.4) drinks per
two weeks. Both results suggest that the positive effect of T on y that is re-
ported by the Poisson model with exogenous treatment is spuriously driven
by a positive bias which results from the fact that individuals endogenously
sort themselves into treatment. In other words, those receiving advice were
also the heaviest drinkers.
When the intensive margin (i.e., drinking participation) and the extensive
margin (i.e., number of drinks conditional on strictly positive drinking) are
allowed to be generated by different DGPs with the Endogenous Participation
Endogenous Treatment (EPET) Poisson model in column 5, the effect of
physician advice falls by more than one drink per week, to 4 (-25%), and
12In analogy to Kenkel and Terza (2001), marginal effects are evaluated at the median
value of the dependent variable.
13Using more Halton draws did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or
standard errors.
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remains highly statistically significant.14 Physician advice turns out to be
endogenous with respect to drinking participation and ρT,P is positive, which
is consistent with the correlation found between advice and drinking intensity
(i.e., ρy,T > 0) and our theoretical predictions in section 3.1. It is also
important to notice that the EPET Poisson model shows that physician
advice has no effect on the likelihood of drinking (column 4), a result in
sharp contrast with that obtained from the simple probit model in which the
positive association between drinking and physician advice was generated by
unobserved heterogeneity. Comparison of the ET and the EPET Poisson
models allows a better understanding of the effect of physician advice, which
does not seem to induce people to quit drinking but simply to cut their
two-week drinking.
The fact that the marginal effect of T on y falls after endogenous partici-
pation is accounted for suggests that treatment effects in the sub-populations
of frequent and occasional drinkers are likely to be different. This will be ob-
served, for instance, if the individuals who continue to drink after receiving
physician advice are those who have a high taste for drinking (that is, high
η) and are, as a consequence, inherently less willing to cut their drinking.
Therefore, the response to advice in the sub-population of ‘happy drinkers’
is likely to be lower than among the sub-population of occasional drinkers
because the marginal rate of substitution of drinks for years of healthy life is
different in these two sub-populations. Again, the finding is in line with the
behavioral model outlined in section 3.1.
Two considerations are worth mentioning. Firstly, in Kenkel and Terza’s
specific case pooling the intensive and the extensive margins and forcing
the DGPs to be the same for the two choices is not very harmful because
the effect of the treatment on the two outcomes goes in the same direction,
although our estimates suggest that only the intensive margin is affected by
physician advice. Furthermore, correlations between unobservables in the
endogenous treatment and drinking intensity, and between unobservables in
the endogenous treatment and the endogenous participation, all have the
same sign. Secondly, Kenkel and Terza use a flexible functional form —
the non-linear inverse Box-Cox form — that, although imposing the same
DGP for the intensive and extensive drinking margins, produces marginal
effects (about -4.5 drinks) that are somewhat between the ones reported
14Consistently with the behavioral model in section 3.1, we included the same set of
controls both in the drinking participation and in the drinking intensity equations. The
same is done, for instance, in Terza et al. (2008). In general, unlike in the sample selection
model in which there might be specific factors affecting non-response but not necessarily
affecting intensity of consumption, in the case of endogenous participation it is hard to
think of variables affecting the intensive or the extensive margin only.
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by a model that only deals with the endogenous treatment problem and
the ones obtained from a model that deals with both endogenous treatment
and endogenous participation (the EPET Poisson model). Clearly, in other
applications the consequences of neglecting endogenous participation may be
more substantial.
In order to have an idea of the goodness of the exclusion restrictions, Ta-
ble 3 reports the marginal effects for the physician advice equation and Wald
tests for the variables identifying the model over and above functional form
and covariance restrictions. In both the ET and the EPET Poisson mod-
els Wald tests suggest that the identifying variables are highly statistically
significant and the model is unlikely to suffer from weak identification.
3.3.2 The effect of other covariates
The main advantage of a model not imposing the same DGPs on the intensive
and the extensive drinking margins is that not only the effect of the treatment
but also that of other covariates are allowed to differ across the two choices.
Think of, for instance, the effect of parental supervision, or strictness of par-
enting styles, on youngsters’ smoking. In this case, parenting style is likely to
affect the likelihood of smoking participation but it is rather unlikely to af-
fect the quantity of cigarettes smoked given participation. Similarly, alcohol
(cigarette) taxes and prices are more likely to affect the quantity of drinks
(cigarettes) consumed than the drinking (smoking) prevalence itself. Table
4 reports the marginal effects (at the sample mean) of the other covariates
estimated in the EPET Poisson model, and shows which is the relevant mar-
gin (intensive, extensive or both) affected by the regressors. Just to take a
few examples, it is interesting to notice that years of education are positively
associated with the probability of drinking but negatively associated with the
average number of drinks consumed. Individuals in their forties and fifties
drink less on average, but this effect is entirely accounted for by their lower
probability of drinking. We also report the marginal effects obtained from
the ET Poisson model for the sake of completeness.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a FIML estimator for count data models with
endogenous treatment effects and either sample selection or endogenous par-
ticipation, which is implemented using maximum simulated likelihood. Sam-
ple selection occurs when the main outcome is missing for some individuals
and the data are not missing at random (NMAR). In contrast, endogenous
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participation occurs when participation into an activity (e.g., smoking or
drinking) and the intensity of the activity are produced by two different, but
correlated, DGPs.
For illustrative purposes, we have applied our proposed estimator to the
Kenkel and Terza (2001)’s data on physician advice and drinking. Our esti-
mates suggest that in these data (i) neglecting treatment endogeneity leads
to a perversely signed effect of physician advice on drinking intensity, (ii)
neglecting endogenous participation leads to an upward biased estimator of
the treatment effect of physician advice on drinking intensity.
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Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable name Definition mean S.D.
Dependent variable
y Total drinks last two weeks 14.697 22.753
Treatment variable
T Physician advice to reduce drinking 0.278 -
Control variables(a)
EDITINC Income ($1,000) 2.575 5.008
AGE30 30 < age ≤ 40 0.180 -
AGE40 40 < age ≤ 50 0.195 -
AGE50 50 < age ≤ 60 0.182 -
AGE60 60 < age ≤ 70 0.199 -
AGEGT70 Age > 70 0.122 -
EDUC Years of schooling 12.925 3.087
BLACK Black d.v. 0.133 -
OTHER Non-white 0.018 -
MARRIED Married 0.645 -
WIDOW Widowed 0.052 -
DIVSEP Divorced or separated 0.160 -
EMPLOYED Employed 0.666 -
UNEMPLOY Unemployed 0.029 -
NORTHE Northeast 0.217 -
MIDWEST Midwest 0.275 -
SOUTH South 0.295 -
Excluded variables(b)
MEDICARE Insurance through Medicare 0.252 -
MEDICAID Insurance through Medicaid 0.031 -
CHAMPUS Military insurance 0.059 -
HLTHINS Health insurance 0.815 -
REGMED Reg. source of care 0.821 -
DRI See same doctor 0.721 -
MAIORLIM Limits on major daily activity 0.086 -
SOMELIM Limits on some daily activity 0.077 -
HVDIAB Have diabetes 0.061 -
HHRTCOND Have heart condition 0.146 -
HADSTROKE Had stroke 0.036 -
(a) These are the variables included in both the main equation (and the
endogenous participation equation) and the endogenous treatment equation.
(b) These are the variables only included in the endogenous treatment
equation.
Note. This table reports the definitions, the means and the standard devia-
tions (S.D.) for the variables used in Kenkel and Terza (2001). Data refer to
the 1990 National Health Interview Survey. The estimation sample includes
2,467 observations.
26
Table 2 Marginal effects of physician advice on the number of drinks consumed in
the last two weeks and on the probability of drinking
Poisson Probit ET(a) EPET(a)
Poisson Poisson
y(b) Pr(y > 0)(c) y(b) Pr(y > 0)(c) y(b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Physician advice (T) 3.679*** 0.079*** -5.382*** -0.040 -4.026***
(0.558) (0.017) (0.330) (0.030) (0.473)
ρy,T 0.791*** 0.677***
(0.024) (0.050)
ρy,P 0.364***
(0.061)
ρT,P 0.208***
(0.044)
ση 1.887*** 1.422***
(0.051) (0.044)
N.obs. 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467
Log-likelihood -32,263 -1,247 -10,249 -10,060
*** significant at 1%. Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors (RSE) in round brackets.
Standard errors on marginal effects are computed using the Delta method.
(a) Model estimated by maximum simulated likelihood with 400 Halton draws. Adding extra
Halton did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or standard errors.
(b) Marginal effects (ME) are computed at the sample median of the dependent variable, in
analogy to Kenkel and Terza (2001).
(c) Marginal effects (ME) are computed at the sample mean of the independent variables.
Note. The dependent variable (y) is the number of alcoholic drinks consumed in the last two
weeks. Estimation refers to the the 1990 National Health Interview Survey with the sample
selection and covariates used in Kenkel and Terza (2001). T and P are dichotomous indicators
of individual treatment status and participation to the drinking activity (y > 0), respectively.
ET and EPET stand for Endogenous Treatment and Endogenous Participation Endogenous
Treatment, respectively. Both models were estimated using MSL and 400 Halton draws. The
joint Wald test statistic for ρy,T = ρy,P = ρT,P = 0 in the EPET Poisson model, distributed as
a χ2(3), is 181.68 (p-value=0.00).
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Table 3 Marginal effects of covariates on the physician
advice equation
ET(a) EPET(a)
Poisson Poisson
ME RSE ME RSE
EDITINC 0.000 0.002 0.000*** 0.000
AGE30 0.099*** 0.033 0.094*** 0.036
AGE40 0.031 0.031 0.057* 0.034
AGE50 0.054* 0.032 0.050 0.038
AGE60 0.057 0.038 0.052 0.042
AGEGT70 0.088* 0.051 0.058 0.053
EDUC -0.012*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.000
BLACK 0.102*** 0.025 0.089*** 0.025
OTHER 0.119* 0.058 0.077 0.059
MARRIED 0.031 0.023 0.027 0.025
WIDOW 0.07 0.046 0.063 0.046
DIVSEP 0.078** 0.032 0.081** 0.035
EMPLOYED -0.008 0.025 -0.014 0.025
UNEMPLOY 0.109** 0.053 0.046 0.054
NORTHE -0.007 0.023 0.024 0.024
MIDWEST -0.02 0.021 -0.016 0.024
SOUTH -0.027 0.021 -0.017 0.023
Excluded variables(b)
MEDICARE 0.015 0.046 0.010 0.043
MEDICAID 0.007 0.033 0.017 0.035
CHAMPUS -0.050** 0.023 -0.070*** 0.023
HLTHINS 0.042* 0.025 0.064** 0.026
REGMED 0.011 0.022 -0.007 0.025
DRI 0.051 0.035 0.007 0.031
MAIORLIM 0.01 0.027 -0.000 0.027
SOMELIM 0.110*** 0.036 0.085*** 0.033
HVDIAB 0.065*** 0.024 0.068*** 0.023
HHRTCOND 0.03 0.037 0.059 0.040
HADSTROKE -0.009 0.029 -0.021 0.030
F-test excluded variables 50.71 51.08
[0.00] [0.00]
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors (RSE) are reported.
P-values in square brackets. Standard errors on marginal effects
are computed using the Delta method.
(a) Model estimated by maximum simulated likelihood with 400
Halton draws. Adding extra Halton did not produce important
changes in coefficients and/or standard errors.
(b) Variables excluded from the drinking equations for (economic)
identification.
Note. The dependent variable (y) is the number of alcoholic drinks
consumed in the last two weeks. The table reports the marginal
effects (ME) of covariates of the physician advice equation and the
F-tests for the exclusion of the identifying variables obtained with
the ET and the EPET Poisson models.
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Table 4. Marginal effects of other covariates
ET(a) EPET(a)
Poisson Poisson
y Pr(y > 0) y
ME RSE ME RSE ME RSE
EDITINC 0.064*** 0.024 0.001** 0.001 0.089*** 0.022
AGE30 1.493*** 0.410 -0.029* 0.016 1.039 1.140
AGE40 -0.509 0.325 -0.050*** 0.017 0.161 0.867
AGE50 -0.016 0.340 -0.060*** 0.019 -0.459 1.157
AGE60 0.359 0.364 -0.024 0.019 -1.213 1.161
AGEGT70 0.192 0.409 0.001 0.021 -2.104* 1.129
EDUC -0.176*** 0.030 0.008*** 0.002 -0.416*** 0.076
BLACK -0.026 0.258 0.008 0.012 -1.753*** 0.479
OTHER -0.319 0.332 0.041 0.026 -3.267*** 0.510
MARRIED -0.567* 0.294 -0.010 0.012 -1.130** 0.488
WIDOW 0.824** 0.342 0.004 0.022 0.036 0.589
DIVSEP 0.867** 0.422 0.009 0.016 2.124 1.393
EMPLOYED 0.102 0.252 0.073*** 0.013 -0.534 0.500
UNEMPLOY 6.082*** 0.798 0.094*** 0.018 3.593 2.232
NORTHE -1.107*** 0.286 -0.036*** 0.012 -0.286 0.532
MIDWEST -1.126*** 0.203 -0.050*** 0.012 -1.394** 0.566
SOUTH -1.292*** 0.189 -0.048*** 0.012 -1.464*** 0.483
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Eicker-Huber-
White robust standard errors (RSE) are reported. Standard errors on marginal
effects (ME) are computed using the Delta method.
(a) Model estimated by maximum simulated likelihood with 400 Halton draws.
Adding extra Halton did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or
standard errors.
Note. The dependent variable (y) is the number of alcoholic drinks consumed
in the last two weeks. Marginal effects (ME) are computed at the sample mean
of the independent variables.
